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TEKNIK TERTINGKAT UNTUK PENGESANAN DAN
KLASIFIKASI ANOMALI PROTOKOL PENEMUAN JIRAN
ABSTRAK
            Kajian ini membentangkan penyelesaian, yang dikenali sebagai "Pemantauan Protokol
Penemuan Tetangga Pintar (INDPMon)", berfungsi untuk meningkatkan tahap keselamatan
rangkaian IPv6, dengan mengekalkan pengawasan yang berterusan berkenaan insiden Protokol
Penemuan Tetangga (NDP), kelemahan, dan kemungkinan serangan dalam membantu kepu-
tusan pengurusan risiko organisasi. INDPMon menggunakan pendekatan analisis rangkaian
untuk memantau paket lapisan rangkaian, dan menggunakan kaedah protokol stateful untuk
menggambarkan anomali protokol dengan tepat. Mesin keadaan terhingga terluas digunakan
untuk memahami dan menganalisis tingkah laku dinamik protokol supaya sebarang peristiwa
pelanggaran yang menyebabkan anomali NDP dapat dispesifikasi. Peristiwa yang paling disk-
riminatif dipilih untuk menentukan ciri-ciri set NDP yang akan digunakan untuk menggam-
barkan kelakuan NDP. Tapak ujian telah digunakan untuk menjana set data NDP dan proses
awal prosedur dilakukan kepada set data NDP yang dijana bagi tujuan optimasi. Set data NDP
bersama-sama ciri-ciri set NDP digunakan untuk membuat set data perwakilan ciri-ciri NDP
yang merupakan tulang belakang INDPMon untuk ramalan dan klasifikasi keputusan. Buat
masa ini, alat pemantauan NDP, yang dikenali sebagai NDPMon, adalah penyelesaian yang
biasa dinamakan untuk memantau NDP. Walau bagaimanapun, NDPmon menggunakan tek-
nik pemadanan pasif dan bergantung kepada fasa latihan untuk mengenal pasti nod rangkaian
yang sah, yang memberi kesan kepada kedinamikan dan skalabiliti. Hasil penilaian menun-
jukkan bahawa INDPMon mempunyai ketepatan pengesanan yang lebih signifikan berbanding
xix
NDPMon, menjadikan ia satu penyelesaian yang menjanjikan untuk pemantauan NDP. Ke-
cekapan pengesanan membolehkan pentakrifan satu set ciri-ciri NDP yang menggambarkan
tingkah laku protokol dengan tepat. Ia adalah penting untuk menyebut bahawa INDPMon ha-
nya boleh mengesan anomali NDP. Oleh itu, ia mesti digabungkan dengan penyelesaian lain
untuk membina penyelesaian keselamatan lengkap. Sebagai usaha ke arah memastikan ma-
sa depan Internet, sumbangan utama kajian ini ialah memperkenalkan satu rangka kerja yang
mampu memantau secara berterusan dan menganalisis proses kelakuan NDP bagi menyediakan
sokongan keputusan mengenai pelanggaran piawaian NDP atau polisi organisasi.
xx
ENHANCED TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
OF NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL ANOMALIES
ABSTRACT
            This research presents enhanced solution, called " Intelligent Neighbor Discovery Pro-
tocol Monitoring (INDPMon)", for improving the security of IPv6 networks by maintaining
constant awareness of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) incidents, vulnerabilities, and at-
tacks to support organizational risk management decisions. INDPMon adapts a network anal-
ysis approach to monitor network layer packets, and utilizes a stateful protocol methodology
to precisely describe the protocol anomalies. Extended Finite State Machine is used to under-
stand and analyze the dynamic behavior of the protocol in order to specify the violation events
that cause NDP anomalies. The most discriminative events are selected to define the NDP fea-
tures set which used to characterize the NDP behavior. Testbed has been used to generate NDP
dataset and preprocessing procedures are applied to the generated NDP dataset for optimiza-
tion. NDP dataset along with NDP features set are used to create a representative NDP features
dataset which is the backbone of INDPMon for prediction and classifications decisions. Cur-
rently, NDP monitoring tool, called (NDPMon), is the commonly cited solution for monitoring
NDP. However, NDPMon uses passive matching techniques and depends on training phase to
identify network legitimate nodes, which affects the dynamism and scalability. The evaluation
results showed that the proposed INDPMon has a significant detection accuracy over NDP-
Mon, which makes it a promising solution for NDP monitoring. The detection efficiency is
resulted of defining a set of NDP features that precisely characterizes the protocol behaviors.
It is important to mention that INDPMon can only detect NDP anomalies. Hence, it must be
xxi
combined with other solutions to build a complete security solution. Working towards securing
the future Internet, the major contribution of this research is introducing a framework that is
capable of continuously monitoring and analyzing the processes of NDP behaviors to provide
decision support regarding the violation of NDP standards or organization policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter provides a clear view of the research presented in this thesis. It discusses the
security issues of the Internet and justifies the need for improvement. It includes the research
motivation and problem, research objectives, and research scope that are presented in Sections
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, respectively. Section 1.5 presents the research contribution on securing
NDP which is done through several steps that are covered in Section 1.6. Finally, the thesis
organization is presented in Section 1.7.
1.1 Internet Issues
The massive growth of Internet users led to the exhaustion of Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4)
(Postel et al., 1981b) address pool that limits IPv4 public addresses to relatively scarce num-
bers (APNIC, 2011; LACNIC, 2014; RIPE, 2012). Even with the use of Network Address
Translation (NAT) (Egevang and Francis, 2001); the rapid growth of Internet usage ensures the
exhaustion of IPv4 public addresses at the end (Groat et al., 2011).
To overcome the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses, Internet Assign Number Authority (IANA)
had started to allocate addresses using the next generation of addressing Internet Protocol Ver-
sion 6 (IPv6) (Deering, 1998). IPv6 is expected to replace IPv4, however, IPv4 still carries the
majority of Internet traffic; in January 2016, the percentage of users reaching Google services
over IPv4 is nearly 90% (Google, 2016). Figure 1.1 illustrates IPv4 pool addresses and the
corresponding time spans.
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Figure 1.1: Projection of Consumption of Remaining IPv4 Address Pools (Adapted from (Hus-
ton, 2015))
Due to the fast exhaustion of IPv4 addresses, organizations are forced to deploy IPv6 and
create security policies to deal with the existing security considerations in IPv6 (Najjar and
El-Taj, 2015; Saad et al., 2013; Gont, 2013). Although IPv6 design includes the original spec-
ification of Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) to secure IPv6, the manual configuration limits
its applicability and it is not recommended (Jankiewicz et al., 2011).
As a successor of IPv4, IPv6 was built with security in mind; however, Neighbor Discovery
Protocol (NDP) (Narten, Simpson, Nordmark and Soliman, 2007), which is one of the main
protocols used by IPv6 suits, has several security concerns (CISCO, 2011). Moreover, the
designers of IPv6 suppose that local area network (LAN) consists of trusted users. Hence,
NDP trusts every device insides LAN which makes it exposed to various attacks. Also, Eernst
and Young (Paul Kessel, 2014), which is a global leader company in assurance, tax, transaction
and advisory services, emphasized in their survey in 2013 and 2014 that employees were seen
as the most likely source of an attack, and still seen as a significant risk. Furthermore, most
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of LANs involve a security privileges hierarchy between users and these privileges must be
granted between users.
In addition, IPv6 designers have not anticipated the large deployment of wireless networks
which has a minimal or no link-layer authentication, such as public networks in airports and
other places. Likewise, they suppose that LANs can be physically protected (Arkko et al.,
2002).
Therefore, in communication systems, the use of new technologies which have security
limitation due the lack of registration and authentication makes these systems prone to attacks.
In IPv6 networks, NDP allow the connected devices to generate their IP addresses and start to
communicate with other devices without any registration or authentication inside the network.
In addition, most of the existing operating systems are IPv6 enabled by default, thus, LANs
are exposed to IPv6 attacks even if IPv6 is not the protocol that is used for communication.
Therefore, the only way to prevent these attacks by manually disabling IPv6.
The differences between IPv4 and IPv6 change the types of attacks. The main change in
IPv6 is on how IP interacts with the link layer; for example, NDP replaces Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) (Plummer, 1982), thus; Internet Control Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6)
(Conta and Gupta, 2006) messages is used in address resolution instead of Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) messages(Postel et al., 1981a). Moreover, in IPv4 network, address
resolution attacks can be prevented by disabling some ICMP messages, however, in IPv6 net-
work, disabling ICMPv6 messages affect the network, therefore, techniques such as SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND) is a must to secure NDP (Arkko et al., 2005). Supriyanto et al.
(2013) stated "Without SEND, we will fall prey to the same class of attacks we faced in IPv4
over networks". The next subsection highlight the effects of using IPv6 on common attacks to
confirm the security implications of using IPv6.
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IPv6 Commonly Known Attacks
Reconnaissance Attack: Reconnaissance attack seems more complicated in IPv6 net-
works since the usual subnet size is 64 bits and with the same speed of scanning IPv4 subnet,
it would take 60 billion years to scan all addresses, which makes regular scanning techniques
impossible unless an adversary uses different approaches; however, Chown (2008) mentioned
that some techniques reduce the subset size, as if the adversary knows the Ethernet vendor
prefix, which results in reducing the search space to 48 bits and if the Ethernet vendor prefix
is known , the search space may reduce to 24 bits. Moreover, Network Mapper tool has the
ability to collect all IPv6 messages by sending only one echo message (Lyon, 2009).
ARP Attacks. In IPv4, ARP spoofing enables adversary parties to intercept, modify, or
even stop data in transit. In order to prevent ARP spoofing, Cisco implemented a new technique
called (snooping) (Cisco, 2012). On the other hand , the situation is considerably different in
IPv6; even though ARP is replaced by NDP, similar attacks are still possible through Neighbor
Solicitation and Neighbor Advertisement spoofing (Nikander et al., 2004).
Smurf Attack. In IPv4-Smurf attacks, the adversary sends an echo-request message (ping
utility) with a destination address of a subnet broadcast and a spoofed source address using
the host IP address of the victim. This derives all the devices on the subnet to respond to the
spoofed source IP address, and consequently, flooding the victim with echo-reply messages. In
IPv6, the concept of an IP broadcast is removed; however, the Smurf attack can be performed
using the generated Neighbor Solicitation and Neighbor Advertisement messages (Parameter
Problem ICMPv6 message) (Scott Hogg, 2009).
Flooding attack. Flooding attack is one of the most frequent attacks present in IPv4 net-
works. Also, this type of attack affects IPv6 networks by flooding the network of NDP mes-
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sages (Chown and Venaas, 2011).
Application Layer Attack. The only change in Application-layer attack by applying IPv6
is the propagation of worms (Chen et al., 2003; Kamra et al., 2005). Traditionally, worms
make local and wild scanning to find victim hosts (Zou et al., 2005), which makes it unlikely
to succeed in IPv6 environment; but as mentioned earlier, while taking advantage of local
knowledge and patterns in address space assignment, the attack program can reduce the search
space considerably. Also the use of all nodes multicast address.
1.2 Research Motivation
NDP uses stateless mechanisms without any authentication or registration, therefore, NDP
nodes are exposed to attacks, and because most operating systems of the network computers
are IPv6 enabled by default, this makes IPv4 nodes also exposed to the earlier presented NDP
attacks until IPv6 is manually disabled. Most of these problems are inherited from the old
version IPv4. However, attacks in IPv4 can be prevented by disabling some protocol messages
while these messages are the core of the IPv6 network. Disabling them affects IPv6 main
functions, which makes it an impossible choice.
In IPv6 networks, NDP allows any connected node to generate its own IP addresses and
start communication with other connected devices without registration or authentication inside
the network. Consequently, the attacker can claim himself as any device inside LAN by spoof-
ing the protocol messages. For instance, Figure 1.2 illustrates the router messages spoofing
attack.
In this scenario, the attacker sends spoofed messages to all network hosts inside the net-
work, advertising himself as the default router. Any host receives these messages, immediately
updates its default router to be the attacker node without any verification, and starts to commu-
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Figure 1.2: Router spoofing Messages(Adapted from (Weber, 2013))
nicate with the fake router as the default router. Therefore, the attacker can launch MITMA by
capturing,sniffing, and forwarding the victim's traffic, or launch Denial of Service (DoS) attack
by sending spoofing messages containing the address of unreachable router.
Figure 1.3 illustrates another scenario where the attacker can spoof a cretin Neighbor Ad-
vertisement message to launch MITMA attacks or DoS attacks. Through spoofing the host
messages, the attacker redirects all network traffic over his node, and starts capturing, sniffing,
and even changing redirected traffic.
Figure 1.3: Neighbor Advertisement spoofing Messages(Adapted from (Weber, 2013))
Moreover, the attacker can launch DoS attacks by answering all messages generating by
duplicated address detection algorithm which is used to verify the uniqueness of the generated
IP addresses. Answering these messages prevents the new hosts from getting new addresses;
thus, the host will not be able to access the network. Furthermore, the attacker can flood the
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entire LAN with thousands of fake router addresses, keeping the hosts busy in generating new
global IP addresses, which exhausts the host's resources and eventually freezing them totally.
In order to secure NDP, many solutions were proposed to prevent or detect NDP anomalies.
Most of the organizations employ the latest technologies in Intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDPS), which monitor all events occurring in computer systems or networks, ana-
lyzing them for signs of possible incidents and attempting to stop detected possible incidents.
However, detecting every intrusion attempts increases the number of false positive alerts (no-
tifying the administrator of normal action as anomaly action). In a large organization, usually
IDPs generate thousand to millions of alerts per day; most of them are false positive, which
means more malicious events are detected. However, more analysis resources are needed to
differentiate false positives from true malicious events. This large number of alerts put system
administrators in critical situations, where all alerts must be scanned and classified as normal
or threats, then they must response promptly to stop threats or slow down them, which is a very
tough mission.
Attack prevention solutions such as IPsec intends to secure IPv6 network; yet, it is prone to
bootstrapping and needs manual configurations which make it limited to small networks. More-
over, it must verify the ownership of dynamic IP addresses which impossible (Jara et al., 2014;
Rantos et al., 2013). Another prevention solution is SEND which it's the best solution where
IPsec found to be an impractical choice, however, using public key infrastructure for generating
addresses increases the protocol complexity and need a high computational processed which
make it prone to DoS. Moreover, statically configured addresses and addresses generated using
fixed identifiers can not be protected by SEND (Frankel et al., 2010). Trust-ND, ND-Shield,
SAVI, and RA-Guard are another examples of preventing solutions, most of them violate the
design principle of NDP in terms of complexity and overhead, or needs a specific hardware
with manual configuration. In this regard, Narten, Thomson and Jinmei (2007)) stated that:
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"stateless autoconfiguration mechanism requires no manual configuration of hosts, minimal (if
any) configuration of routers, and no additional servers".On the other hand, monitoring solu-
tions do not need any modification to the protocol, and they provide a constant awareness of
protocol incidents, which make them essential for securing NDP network.
1.3 Research Problem
Existing passive monitoring solutions such as NDPMon use passive training phase to define le-
gitimate nodes, which lack the scalability and dynamism of the solutions. In the training phase,
all connected devices are considered legitimate even they are compromised, which make it dif-
ficult task to detect the compromised nodes. Moreover, most operating systems by default use
multiple IP addresses for privacy reasons (Chown and Venaas, 2011). Using passive matching
monitoring solution in such environments is impossible since it must run the passive training
every time new address is added to the new address to legitimate address list. This makes it one
of the main challenges facing these solutions and makes it limited to specific environments. For
instance, public environment, each time a new station connect or leave makes passive matching
techniques are useless by increasing the numbers of false positive alarms. Also existing passive
monitoring solutions do not have any prediction or classification capabilities, which make them
failed in detecting novel attacks.
To avoid passive training phase, NDP active monitoring solutions generate probes into the
network for further analysis. These probes increase the network overhead, and could be used
in Smurf attacks. Moreover, it can not detect the attacks generated from legitimate nodes.
Prio-drop, Host Based IDS, and v6IIDs are another examples of monitoring solution. Most of
them use passive matching techniques which generate a high rate of false positive alerts, which
affects the solution trust, and consequently, systems administrators detect most of the attacks
after they have already happened (Chauhan et al., 2012; Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).
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Furthermore, one of the major problems that disrupts the research on securing NDP using
intelligent techniques is the absence of representative NDP dataset. Most of existing bench-
mark dataset do not have IPv6 packet (Najjar and Kadhum, 2015), and others do not have all
features that accurately characterize the protocol behaviors (SAAD et al., 2014).
1.4 Research Goal and Objectives
The ultimate goal of this research is to build a solution that improves the IPv6 network security
without increase in the complexity of NDP or adding overhead to the network by monitoring
NDP main processes, and report any violation to the protocol standards. To achieve the research
goal, the following objectives have to be accomplished:
1. To design a solution that improved of accuracy in detection and classification of NDP
anomalies, which would help in better decision making to secure the network environ-
ment. Therefore, this objective has been further broken down into the following sub-
objectives:
• To model the NDP behaviors to provide a better visualization, understanding, and
assist in specifying the behaviors of the protocol.
• To provide the prediction and classification capabilities to the proposed solution by
defining an informative NDP features set that accurately characterizes the normal
and abnormal protocol behaviors. These generated features are the backbone of the
solution prediction and classification capabilities.
• To create representative NDP dataset that assist in generating NDP features dataset
that is used to train the proposed solution.
2. To verify and validate the proposed solution design in terms of detection accuracy, sen-
sitivity, and specificity, and compare it to the existing NDP detection approach in order
9
to determine the proposed solution effectiveness at securing NDP.
1.5 Research Scope
This research concentrates on improving the security of IPv6 network by maintaining moni-
toring and analysis capability of NDP processes to provide decision support regarding situa-
tional awareness and a violation of expectations. Therefore, research focuses on detecting NDP
anomalies which occur only inside IPv6 LAN. NDP uses five ICMPv6 messages to complete
its functions. Accordingly, the proposed solution only inspects packets that contain these five
messages, since these messages are the main source for defining the features used to detect
NDP anomalies. Due the lacking of IPv6 dataset and resources, Testbed includes seven nodes
were used to create NDP dataset, and also used to verify and validate the proposed solution and
the proposed solution evaluated only according to the correctness of NDP anomalies detection
and classification. Figure 1.4 illustrate the network scope of the research. The area inside the
red shape is the network scope interest of this research.
Figure 1.4: Research Scope
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1.6 Research Contributions
IPv6 is considered as the backbone of the future Internet; however, it is prone to attack since
NDP uses unsecure mechanisms. Thus, the main contribution of the research presented in this
thesis is the enhancement of the overall IPv6 security environments where the trust between
nodes is a critical issue. In regard to the importance of contribution towards securing the fu-
ture Internet, an intelligent solution is proposed, which accurately detects any signs of possible
NDP incidents that are considered violations or imminent threats of violation to organizations
security policies. In terms of the contributions to the body of knowledge, extended finite state
machine modelling is proposed for NDP behavior study and analysis, where it can be of great
benefits for further research on dynamics of NDP in order to build security tools for NDP.
Such modelling can provide informative NDP features set that can be defined to accurately
characterize the protocol behaviors. These features describe the behaviors of NDP and help
in addressing the protocol violations. In addition, this research provides a baseline of how the
machine learning concept can be adapted to predict novel attacks on NDP and helps in mak-
ing intelligent decisions to stop or deal with the protocol threats. Also, utilizing the machine
learning concept helps in taking the advantage of the optimal NDP features set for defining
potentially predictive relationships used to detect new attacks.
1.7 Research Steps
Figure 1.5 illustrates the research steps followed in conducting this research:
Step 1: Literature Review. This phase covers the background of NDP and its main func-
tions in addition to a detailed analysis of the NDP weakness and threats. Also, approaches
that have been developed to secure NDP and most techniques used to detect NDP attack are
presented.
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Figure 1.5: Research Steps
Step 2: Literature Analysis. This phase discusses and analyzes the major approaches used
to secure NDP, and identifies advantages and limitations for each approach. Hence, it provides
a better understanding of current solutions limitations, research problem and scope, which gives
the knowledge to outline the proposed solution.
Step 3: Modelling and Design. This phase discusses the modelling of NDP normal be-
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havior and utilizes stateful anomaly detection method to define the appropriate NDP feature
set which in turn is used to accurately detect NDP anomalies. In addition, in this phase, NDP
dataset generation is discussed along with a description of the tools that are used in the genera-
tion and preprocessing procedures. The generated dataset along with the defined NDP features
are used to create the NDP features dataset in order to utilize a machine learning technique to
classify the behavior of NDP. Anomalies classification helps in understanding the NDP network
behaviors. The combined proposed solution component design is the output of this stage.
Step 4: Evaluation. In this phase, a real world case study is used to evaluate the efficiency
of the proposed solution in terms of detection correctness. Different NDP behavioral scenarios
are performed and discussed to generate normal and anomalies behavior. Finally, the proposed
solution is validated by comparing it with another existing solution in terms of detection accu-
racy and to ensure its usefulness.
Phase 5: Conclusion. This phase summarizes the research work, presents contributions,
highlights the limitations, and suggests some future work.
1.8 Research Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter Two covers the detailed background of NDP along with fundamental concepts
related to this research, as well as, the current existing related work and highlight the limitation
of each solution.
Chapter Three details out the proposed solution methodology. It explains the proposed
solution requirements and presents the sui table methods and approaches to meet these require-
ments.
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Chapter Four introduces the new solution that is called "Intelligent Neighbor Discovery
Protocol Monitor (INDPMon)", for detecting and classifying NDP anomalies. This chapter
describes the structural design and implementation of INDPMon.
Chapter Five presents a detailed performance evaluation of the proposed INDPMon solu-
tion, in comparison with the performance of the common existing solutions, namely NDPmon.
Chapter Six summarizes the findings of the research presented in this thesis and provides
recommendations for further research work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents a detailed and ncomprehensive background of NDP and the fundamental
concepts related to this research. It discusses the related works on securing NDP and highlights
the limitations of each solution, enwhich provide the motivation to this research. This chapter is
organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides an overview on NDP, Section 2.2 discusses Intrusion
Detection and Prevention systems, Section 2.3 demonstrates the related works, and finally the
chapter is summarized in Section 2.4.
2.1 NDP Overview
NDP is a set of messages and processes which determines relationships between nodes (routers
and hosts) and their neighbor's in the same network. NDP replaces some protocols used in IPv4
such as Router Discovery, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Internet Control Message Pro-
tocol (ICMP), and ICMP Redirect. Additionally, NDP provides new functionalities that are
used for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) and Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD).
IPv6 NDP allows nodes to identify their neighbors on the same LAN and advertise their exis-
tence to other neighbors.
One of the most interesting and potentially valuable addressing feature implemented in
IPv6 is the ability of all nodes to automatically configure their addresses using Stateless Ad-
dress Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) (Narten, Thomson, et al., 2007) without using any state-
ful configuration protocol, such as Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)
Bound et al. (2003). The use of SLAAC gives the ability to IPv6 host to generate link-local
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and global addresses without any manual intervention. The behavior of IPv6 NDP consists of
the following processes:
• Generating IP addresses using SLAAC.
• Verifying the uniqueness of the generated IP address using DAD.
• Resolving IP addresses to their link-layer addresses.
• Maintaining reachability track with neighbor nodes using NUD.
• Using Redirect Message for advertising a better next-hop
2.1.1 NDP Messages
To complete NDP processes, NDP uses five ICMPv6 messages, which are:
1. Router Advertisement (RA) messages are originated by routers and sent periodicity, or
sent in response to Router Solicitation to advertise their presence and send parameters
such as Router Prefix, Maximum Transmit Unit (MTU), a list of prefix, and hop limits.
Furthermore, RA contains the information on how a host configures its global IP address
using stateless of stateful technique.
2. Router Solicitation (RS) messages are originated by hosts at the system startup to request
for an immediately RA message rather than waiting for the next scheduler timer.
3. Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages are originated by hosts that attempt to discover
the link-layer addresses of other nodes on the same local link, or originated by DAD
algorithm, or originated to verifying the reachability of a neighbor.
4. Neighbor Advertisement (NA) messages are sent to advertise the changes of a host MAC
address and IP address, or in response to NS messages which could be sent by address
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resolution process, or by NUD process. Three oodflags are included in NA message:
Router flag, when it is set, it indicates that the sender is a router; Solicited flag indicates
that the NA was sent in response to NS message; and Override flag which indicates that
the NA message information should update an existing cache entry.
5. Redirect messages are used to redirect traffic from one router to another.
2.1.1(a) NDP Messages Options
NDP messages include zero or more option depending on the information sent. There are five
types of options as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: NDP Messages Options
Type Name Description
1 Source Link-layer
It is used by RA, RS, and NS to present
the Link-layer address of the packet sender.
2 Target Link-layer
It is used by RA and NA to present the
address of target link-layer address.
3 Prefix Information
It provides hosts with on-link prefixes and
prefixes for Address Autoconfiguration.
4 Redirected Header
It is used by the redirect messages to contain
all or part of the redirected packets.
5 MTU
It is used by RA to inform all nodes to use
same MTU value in the same link.
2.1.1(b) NDP Message Validity Checks
All NDP message must satisfy the following conditions; if any violation is detected, the mes-
sage must be discarded (Narten, Simpson, Nordmark and Soliman, 2007):
• Hop Limit field equals 255 since all NDP messages must not be forwarded by a router.
• Valid ICMPv6 message checksum.
• ICMPv6 message code is equal to zero.
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• Target address must not be a multicast address.
• Message options must have a length greater than zero.
Neighbor Advertisement message validation has additional validation checks which are as
follows:
• Solicited flag must be zero if the destination IP address is a multicast address.
• ICMPv6 length equals 24 octets or more.
Neighbor Solicitation message validation has additional validation checks which are as
follows:
• If the source IP address in a NS message contains an unspecified address, the destination
IP address of the NS message must be a solicited-node multicast address, and there is no
source link-layer option in the message.
• ICMPv6 length equals 24 octets or more.
Router Advertisement message validation has additional validation checks which are as
follows:
• The source IP address of the RA message must be a link-local address.
• ICMPv6 length equals 16 octets or more.
Router Solicitation message validation has additional validation checks which are as fol-
lows:
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• If the source IP address of the RS message is an unspecified address, the source link-layer
address option of the NS message must not be included in the message.
• ICMPv6 length equals eight octets or more.
2.1.1(c) NDP Constants
NDP constants used to regulate nodes NDP message generation, and allows NDP to operate
over links with widely varying performance characteristics. Table 2.2 illustrates the values and
description for each constant.
Table 2.2: NDP Constants
NDP Constant Name Constant Value Description
Router constants
MAX_INITIAL_RTR_ADVERT_INTERVAL 16 seconds Maximum time between unsolicited RA
MAX_INITIAL_RTR_ADVERTISEMENTS 3 transmissions Maximum number of unsolicited RA
MAX_FINAL_RTR_ADVERTISEMENTS 3 transmissions Maximum number of RA before shutdown
MIN_DELAY_BETWEEN_RAS 3 seconds Minimum time between RA
MAX_RA_DELAY_TIME 0.5 second Maximum delay time for RS response
Host constants
MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY 1 second Maximum delay time for the host to send RS
RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL 4 seconds Maximum time between RS
MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION 3 transmissions Maximum RS for each
Node constants
MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT 3 transmissions Maximum multicast NS for address resolution
MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT 3 transmissions Maximum number of NS solicitation
MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME 1 second Maximum sending delay for anycast
MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENTS 3 transmissions Maximum number of NA
RetransTimer 1,000 miliseconds Retransmission time for NS or NA
AdvValidLifeTime Default 30 days Prefix valid Life-Time
AdvPreferredLifeTime Default 7 days Prefix preferred lifetime
DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME 5 seconds Time waited until upper protocol confirmation
DupAddrDetectTransmits Default 1, 0 disable Maximum number of NS for DAD algorithm
2.1.2 Stateless Autoconfiguration
Stateless Autoconfiguration processes include the generation of link-local IP address, gener-
ation of global IP address, and the verification of the uniqueness of the generated addresses
using DAD algorithm. While configuring its IP address, each node moves through different
IP states which are as follows: Tentative Address state, Preferred Address state, Deprecated
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Address state, Invalid Address state, and DAD-Failure state.
All IPv6 nodes must have a link-local address in order to (i) determine the link-local ad-
dresses of their neighbors, (ii) to communicate with routers, and (iii) to maintain reachability
information for communicated nodes (Carpenter and Jiang, 2014). Failure of configuring link-
local addresses violates one of the design goals of SLAAC mechanism. Consequently, the
process will totally fail and the nodes become blind; yet they cannot communicate with each
other, particularly in the absence of routers and DHCPv6. Manual intervention must be done
to reconfigure the nodes.
2.1.2(a) Link-Local Address Generation
On system startup, each IPv6 node automatically creates a link-local address using the EUI-
64 method or using other methods such as random generation (Hinden and Deering, 2006).
Before assigning link-local address to an interface, the node enters into Tentative Address state
until the uniqueness verification of the tentative address is done using DAD (or enhanced DAD
(Asati et al., 2015)) algorithm which is an enhancement to DAD algorithm to automate the
detection of looped back NDP messages used by DAD, by adding new option variable called
Nonce). DAD and enhanced-DAD abbreviations will be used interchangeably in this research.
While nodes are in Tentative Address state, their interfaces discard all received packets
except DAD related packets. Tentative Address uniqueness verification performed by DAD
algorithm using the information provided in NS and NA messages. The process of DAD in-
volves:
1. On system startup, each node joins the link-local multicast group for all nodes, as well as
a solicited-node group for tentative address, in order to send and receive DAD packets.
Afterward, the node sends NS carrying the host tentative address with random generated
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Nonce, to the solicited-multicast group and waits for a designated NA.
2. If no NA is received within the specified retransmit time, or receiving NS with the same
Nonce number, the tentative address is considered unique within its neighbors, and the
node address state becomes preferred state. The leased time for the unique link-local
address is infinite length time.
3. If NA is received within the specified retransmit time, and the target field contains the
tentative address or receiving NS with target field that contains the tentative address with
different Nonce number, or receiving NS with source address field that contains the ten-
tative address, then, the tentative address is considered invalid, and the node address
state becomes DAD-Failure state. Thereafter, the node leaves the solicited-node multi-
cast group if it does not have another IP address has the same solicited-node multicast
group with the tentative address. In case that a duplicated link-local is generated from
hardware identifier, the IP operation will be disabled; otherwise, the IP operation on the
interface continues Narten, Simpson, Nordmark and Soliman (2007).
The nodes stay in Preferred Address state while the interface is enabled; otherwise, when-
ever the interface becomes disabled manually, or disabled by hardware failure, or the interface
cable unplugged, the nodes restart the procedure of configuring the link-local address. Some-
times the processes of DAD are not reliable; mainly when there are two hosts performing DAD
processes at the same time. Under this circumstance, the two hosts may have the same address
(Narten, Simpson, Nordmark and Soliman, 2007). DAD process must be performed on all
unicast addresses (Asati et al., 2015).
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2.1.2(b) Global Address Generation
In order to configure the IPv6 global address, hosts must communicate with a router or DHCPv6
to obtain the prefix information options that will be appended to the interface identifier (Singh
et al., 2010). This information is sent via RA message or DHCPv6. Moreover, RA provides
information that guides the host on how to perform address configuration using a stateless or
stateful technique.
In addition, RA provides important IPv6 parameters such as default route, MTU, default
Hop-limit, and Domain Name Server option (Jeong et al., 2010). The process of global Ad-
dresses creation is as follows:
1. On system startup, in the absence of RA, the host sends RS to routers multicast group
address.
2. If no RA is received within the specified retransmit time, the host keeps sending NS
messages every BackOff timer (Krishnan et al., 2015).
3. If RA is received, then the host generates global address by appending the received pre-
fix to the interface identifier; therewith, the host enters Tentative Address state, along
with proceeding DAD process. In case of DAD process failure, the state of the address
becomes DAD-Failure state. Otherwise, the process of DAD succeeds and each address
must have two timers derived from RA, namely PreferredLifeTime and ValidLifeTime.
Whenever the host has a global address, PreferredLifeTime and ValidLifeTime are re-
freshed through RA.
Routers must periodically send RA messages announcing their availability and information
about the network. Whenever the host receives these packets, it must update its related entries,
such as default router. RA must only refresh addresses derived from a prefix option advertised
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in RA. Furthermore, the valid time of the prefix must be greater than preferred time of it. If
the host's IPv6 global address preferred time is greater than the it's valid time, the host enters
the Preferred Address state. Whenever the preferred time becomes zero, and the valid time is
greater than zero, the host enters Deprecated Address state; otherwise, the IP address becomes
invalid and the host enters the Invalid Address state. While the host is in Deprecated Address
state, the address should only be used by applications that have been using it until the session
is finished, in order to not disrupt the connection.
2.1.3 Address Resolution and Neighbor Unreachability Detection
NDP replaces the ARP for resolving node's addresses to MAC address. NDP uses Address
Resolution process to resolve IPv6 addresses and uses NUD to keep track of the reachability to
other nodes. In Address Resolution and NUD processes, NDP uses NS and NA messages.
With the aim of sending data to neighbor nodes, each node must know the MAC address of
the corresponding neighboring node. If the node does not have the MAC address of the receiver,
it initiates the Address Resolution process by sending NS to the solicited-node multicast group
of the receiver address requesting its MAC address. Meanwhile, the sending node creates a
record for the receiver IP address in its cache and makes the address status Incomplete.
Whenever the sender node receives a solicited-NA message, which is a response to NS
message, the sender node updates the cache record with the MAC address and changes the
address status to Reachable for a specific time; after the time expired, the status of the address
becomes Stale. Moreover, the status of the address becomes Stale at any time the host receives
unsolicited NA, NS, or Redirect messages; and updating the cache record with new MAC
address as well. When a node sends packets to Stale address, the address status becomes
Delay for DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME (in seconds) to give the upper protocol the chance to
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update the address reachability. Hence, the address status becomes Reachable when the node
receives a confirmation from the upper protocol. If DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME is expired,
the status of the address becomes Probe. In Probe state, the nodes send a unicast NS message to
confirm the reachability of the address. If there is no confirmation received, the address status
becomes Unreachable and the node sends Solicited-Multicast NS every Exponential backoff
timer (Gashinsky and Nordmark, 2014).
2.1.4 Redirect Messages
NDP Redirect messages are similar to ICMP redirect, which are sent to hosts by routers to
inform them of a better next-hop destination. Redirect message assists hosts to choose the
most efficient routing path. Once the host receives a redirect message, the host either updates
the existing cache record for the target or creates a new cache record.
2.1.5 NDP Common Attacks
Nikander et al. (2004) specify three different trust models for securing NDP, each model has
different level of trust:
• High trust; all authenticated nodes in this model trust each other and treat each IP layer
message as a legitimate one. In this model, all NDP message do not contain any false
information. Corporate Intranet Model is an example of this model.
• Semi trust; where there are some nodes are trusted inside the network. For example,
legitimate routers that are considered the only trusted nodes which routes all packets
between the local network nodes and any connected external networks. Public Wireless
Network with an operator is an example of this model.
• No trust, where there is no trust between nodes at the IP layer. Ad hoc network is an
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